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Abstract  
The ad hoc formation of interorganizational relationships and networks re-
mains a black box for management scholars. We address this phenomenon 
by investigating interorganizational responses to an extreme event. Hence, 
we explore how interorganizational constellations of previously unconnected 
actors formed in response to the large-scale outbreak of enterohemorrhagic 
Escherichia coli (EHEC) in Germany in 2011, which killed 53 people and af-
fected over 4,000. We present a preliminary model of interorganizational as-
semblage and offer propositions that highlight the conditions under which the 
development of collaborations across organizations is made possible in face 
of crises.  
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Throughout history, organizations of different kinds have been confronted 
with disasters and other sorts of lesser emergencies or crises. In such unex-
pected situations, research that uses a network perspective usually focuses 
on interorganizational rescue and/or relief efforts. These efforts benefit from 
established (if not institutionalized) frameworks, and on coordinating mecha-
nisms of public networks and interorganizational procedures (Bigley and 
Roberts 2001; Moynihan 2009; Robinson, Berrett, and Stone 2006; Waugh 
and Streib 2006; Waugh and Sylves 2002). Hence, researchers (Moynihan 
2009; Waugh and Sylves 2002) frequently assume the existence of inter-
organizational relations (IORs). Thus, the focus is on how managers re-
activate specific forms of IORs and/or modify them in such a way as to be 
useful in unexpected situations. Common examples are the definition and 
implementation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) among agencies 
or the use of the incident command systems (ICS) that bind organizations 
together and prepare them for potential collaborations (Bigley and Roberts 
2001; Moynihan 2009).  
While these studies have advanced our understanding of why and how 
organizations prepare collectively for managing crises, or even catastrophes, 
this stream of research ignores the question of how newly generated inter-
organizational constellations actually take shape in the face of unexpected 
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and harmful situations. This gap is surprising if we consider that the insights 
have been gathered by research that uses a complex adaptive system ap-
proach, one which stresses the necessity for self-organization, communica-
tion, and coordination across previously unconnected public agencies (Com-
fort 1994a, b, 2002a, 2007; Kapucu 2006a, b). In fact, in such crisis situa-
tions, actors who are not known to each other often need to coordinate their 
activities very fast, but must do so with a limited knowledge of each other’s 
skills, capabilities, motivations, and communication practices (auf der Heide 
1989; Mitchell 2006; Moynihan 2005; Robinson et al. 2006). Thus, initiating 
IORs and networks – a form of governance that has remained largely unex-
plored from a management perspective (Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, Mischen, 
and Rethemeyer 2011) – becomes imperative if management is to face the 
challenges imposed by crisis situations. Although such instances have been 
observed and documented, research remains conspicuously silent about the 
actual origin of IORs, i.e., the very process (rather than occurrence) of start-
ing a relationship and forming initial ties. Hence, to guide and explore this 
multifaceted phenomenon, we ask the following research questions: 
How do managers assemble new dyadic IORs or more complex interor-
ganizational networks during crises? Against this background, what are the 
barriers to this interorganizational ad hoc coordination, and what makes it 
possible to overcome these barriers?  
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We address these questions by using an in-depth case study of IORs’ 
formation among both previously unconnected and already connected actors 
in response to the large-scale outbreak of an unknown strain of entero-
hemorrhagic Escherichia coli (EHEC) in Germany in 2011. We describe the 
conditions that fostered the collaboration among previously unconnected ac-
tors (e.g., local hospitals and federal and state ministries) that made it possi-
ble for them to confront the situation. Thus, in this paper we contribute not 
only to the literature on ad hoc interorganizational coordination that deals 
with crises and other unexpected events from the perspective of public man-
agement (e.g., Benini 1999; Bigley and Roberts 2001; Comfort 1994a; 
Moynihan 2008; Waugh and Streib 2006), but also to the still scarce re-
search on early-tie formation in IORs and networks (e.g., Isett et al. 2011; 
Kenis and Knoke 2002; Provan and Kenis 2008). Therefore, we introduce 
the concept of interorganizational assemblages (IOAs). We offer a prelimi-
nary framework showing how public managers, in an attempt to come to 
terms with emerging and/or future crises, assemble new dyadic or more 
complex IORs. Thus, we address a crucial question that has remained large-
ly neglected in network studies generally (Isett et al. 2011; Provan, Fish, and 
Sydow 2007; Provan and Kenis 2008). 
We structure our paper as follows. In Section 2 we provide the theoreti-
cal background for our paper. We position our study in the research on or-
ganizations dealing with emergencies, disasters, and other unpleasant sur-
5 
 
prises. In particular, we focus on the research on interorganizational re-
sponses to such events. In Section 3 we present our research and methods, 
thus setting the stage for the EHEC outbreak in Germany in 2011 and delin-
eating our case-study approach. In Section 4 we present data showing how 
the different public agencies engaged in IOA while trying to cope with uncer-
tainty in the EHEC outbreak. In Section 5 we discuss our observations by 
introducing a preliminary model of IOA that offers propositions for future re-
search. Section 6 concludes. 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
2.1 How do IORs form in the face of crisis? 
The question of the formation of IORs and networks has been puzzling 
scholars for decades (Bardach 1998, 2001; Kenis and Knoke 2002; Kruea-
thep, Riccucci, and Suwanmala 2010; Van de Ven 1976). Here, we compre-
hend an IOR as a link between two or more organizations that are formally 
independent legal entities, regardless of whether the link itself is governed in 
a market, hierarchical, or hybrid mode. (For recent overviews, see Provan et 
al. 2007; Wachhaus 2012.) Although many studies have looked into why 
formal IORs emerge (Isett et al. 2011; O’Toole 1997; Provan and Lemaire 
2012), the process by which these dyadic and more complex networks of 
IORs, in particular the collaborative ties (Ring and Van de Ven 1994), initially 
form, and through which their governance actually emerges remains largely 
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unexplored (Provan and Kenis 2008). This critic also holds true particularly 
for informal and ad hoc networks such as task forces, coalitions, and com-
mittees (see Goldstein, 2012). In point of fact, “…despite the preponderance 
of these informal networks, the gap between research and practice is wider 
for informal networks than formal networks [resulting in] very little advance-
ment of our understanding” (Isett et al. 2011, 165).  
We address this gap by looking into ad hoc interorganizational respons-
es to crises. Such extreme events illustrate wickedly demanding problems 
for management (Van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003) that need to be 
addressed by highly adaptive constellations of organizations, in particular 
public agencies, “… because the problem and/or the solution is either un-
known, inconsistent, or frequently changing” (Provan and Lemaire 2012, 
641). In point of fact, using a complex adaptive systems approach, a signifi-
cant body of research has studied interorganizational responses to disasters 
and extreme events, thus focusing on issues of self-organization, resilience, 
or interorganizational learning (e.g., Comfort 1994a, b, 2002a, 2007). These 
studies show that organizations engage in collaborative work, and that in 
their attempt to deal with crises such as oil spills or earthquakes some of 
these organizations are interacting with one another for the first time. Re-
search from an adaptive systems perspective tends to concentrate on the ad 
hoc nature of these relations but remains silent about the actual process of 
tie formation (e.g., Comfort 1994a, b, 2007). Further, a focus on the system 
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level contributes to the creation of a sense of a clean state with respect to 
the history and social context in which the organizations are building new 
relations (Robinson et al. 2006). By contrast, a second stream of research 
pays significant attention to tie formation and crises by using a more explicit 
relational or network perspective (Kapucu, Augustin, and Garayev 2009; 
Kapucu, Arslan, and Collins 2010; McGuire and Silvia 2010; Moynihan 2008, 
2009; Waugh and Streib 2006). These studies focus on preparedness 
through cooperation, and stress their empirical relevance for scholarship on 
networks in general (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Isett et al. 2011; Moynihan 
2008, 2009; Provan and Kenis 2008). Nevertheless, research from a net-
work perspective tends to ignore the ad hoc dimension in the formation of 
ties.  
Against this background, disasters and emergencies provide us with a 
rare opportunity to observe how organizations spontaneously coordinate 
their actions to come to terms with unexpected phenomena (Comfort 1994a; 
Moynihan 2005). In extreme cases, public agencies may even face the need 
to assemble new ties on the fly with organizations to which they were not 
previously connected and which sometimes have little or no experience with 
how to face crises on their own, let alone in a collaborative fashion (auf der 
Heide 1989; Clarke and Short 1993; Mitchell 2006; Robinson et al. 2006).  
When looking at scholarship on interorganizational responses to disas-
ters, the aforementioned critique addressed by Isett et al. (2011) holds true. 
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In contrast to studies that use the complex adaptive systems approach 
(Comfort 1994a, b), issues on the genesis of collaborations in situations of 
unpreparedness are seldom tackled by studies that use the relational or 
network perspective. In point of fact, existing and well-maintained networks 
and interorganizational collaborations often make it easier for network schol-
ars to conduct research and observations on their genesis. For Bardach 
(1998), who provides an early critique of this bias, collaboration across 
agencies often emerges ad hoc due to an unforeseen crisis. In such a situa-
tion, spontaneous interactions across organizations need to exhibit and 
make use of several collaborative capacities that enable temporary leader-
ship in the form of “craftsmanship”. The respective “craftsmen” spontaneous-
ly revert to what is at hand. This approach may not at first seem to be well-
suited to solving the crisis, but craftsmen have the ability to make the best 
use of the “raw materials”.  
However, quite often, accounts of interorganizational responses to disas-
ters rely on existing networks and/or partnerships, thus benefiting from prior 
experiences, formal action frameworks, or mandates. For example, Bigley 
and Roberts (2001) consider the supporting role of the ICS as a provider of 
shared frames of thinking for fire departments involved in interventions. Simi-
larly, Moynihan (2008) highlights the role of installing an ICS in the reduction 
of strategic and institutional uncertainties for a case quite close to our in-
quiry, the Newcastle Disease outbreak, which bears a close resemblance to 
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the EHEC outbreak. In his study, Moynihan stresses a number of barriers 
that prevent effective learning during the crisis, among which is a lack of an 
ICS (cf. also Müller-Seitz and Macpherson in press). In another study 
Moynihan (2009) highlights the centralization of network governance in cri-
ses and the challenges of coordinating across agencies in the absence of 
hierarchical structures. He documents how ICS offer a framework to face cri-
ses. However, differences in the members’ cognitive and normative orienta-
tions remain, resulting in differing ways of responding to a crisis (cf. also 
Robinson et al. 2006). Kapucu et al. (2009) take a similar approach on the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, as does Mitchell (2006) on 
the role of information technologies in the construction of a shared hazard 
response strategy in the European Union. Such studies either stress situa-
tions of failure and the need to better coordinate matters, or else they report 
on the role of existing coordination structures.  
By stressing the need for blueprints in coordination and preparedness, 
these works have advanced our knowledge of the way public agencies plan 
and design structural innovations for cooperation and coordination (Comfort 
2007; Kapucu 2008). Despite these advances, our understanding of interor-
ganizational responses to crises, which focuses on the process of starting ad 
hoc ties across organizations in the absence of preparedness and estab-




2.2 Interorganizational Assemblage in the Face of Crises 
 We develop exploratory, context-sensitive insights about the ad hoc for-
mation of IORs. To achieve this goal we not only perform an in-depth case 
study on the EHEC outbreak in Germany, but also rely on and develop fur-
ther the concept of assemblages (Ong 2004; Ong and Collier 2005). We de-
fine an assemblage as representing the unstable and unstructured interplay 
of different political rationalities, institutions, and actors, “i.e., a milieu of 
transformation that is also for the analyst, a space of problematization” (Ong 
2007). These constellations emerge from instabilities and conflicts, and 
therefore do not feature stable relations among their elements (Collier 2006). 
Building on this notion, Ong (2004) points to the example of global respons-
es to emergencies. Informed by complexity theory and set against the back-
drop of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, Ong de-
fines global assemblages as:  
“… [the] mobilization of significant connections among diverse ele-
ments that have open-ended effects on the meaning of individual 
and social life ... the focus on assemblage reveals how actors … de-
fine and respond by assembling diverse resources in a contingent 
and provisional manner, with varying effects on emerging forms of 
modern ways of living” (Ong 2004, 81). 
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We regard this definition as particularly appropriate, because it sensitiz-
es researchers and managers to the possibility of linking, during an emer-
gency, previously unrelated actors and the resources and knowledge they 
control, while keeping an analytical eye on the contextual influences at play 
and their influence on the dynamics of social construction that surround the 
crisis (Beunza and Stark 2003). Moreover, the notion of assemblage em-
phasizes the necessity to identify the tools and procedures at hand in rela-
tion to the crisis, and to assemble them ad hoc as the actor works towards 
an appropriate solution. These are aspects that must be considered when 
facing large-scale crises in a collaborative fashion (cf. also Bardach 1998, 
2001). Hence, focusing on the way dyadic IORs or more complex networks 
form initially in the face of crises, we introduce the notion of inter-
organizational assemblages (IOAs), so that we can also focus on the very 
early phase of tie-formation or, more precisely, collaboration. If organizations 
do not benefit from established IORs, then collaborative efforts can hardly 
take place without assembling organizations first.  
The notion of IOAs makes it possible for us to be sensitive to the multi-
plexity of the relations among organizations. Multiplexity has long been con-
sidered an attribute of IORs, considering, for example, professional and pri-
vate ties in a similar relation, or the dual flows of technical information and 
staff between two or more organizations (Kenis and Knoke 2002). However, 
multiplexity is primarily defined mathematically (cf. Wasserman and Faust 
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1994), thus ignoring the more often than not subtle interplay between differ-
ent forms of ties or flows in the formation process of IORs, although they al-
so seem to matter in the formation of dyadic or more complex IORs that form 
to confront unexpected events such as the outbreak of a disease.  
3 RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS  
3.1 A Brief Sketch of the EHEC Outbreak 
Food-borne disease outbreaks represent unforeseen and harmful events 
that have a potentially severe societal impact. Further, such outbreaks fre-
quently require close, immediate interactions across organizations within the 
fields of food control and health affairs (e.g., Moynihan 2008). Such events 
can go so far as to cause deaths among consumers, and are often followed 
by severe financial consequences for the retailers, producers, and other or-
ganizations involved. Just such an outbreak offered us the unique opportuni-
ty for an in-depth case study. For this study we use an interpretative re-
search method that makes it possible for us to capture the measures from 
the respondents’ perspective (Yin 2009).  
Due to the disease’s geographical concentration in northern Germany, 
we restrict our analysis to the German public administrations, which dealt 
with uncertainty by forming IORs on an ad hoc basis. Leading actors on a 
national level were the Federal Ministries of Health and of Food, Agriculture, 
and Consumer Protection, and the public agencies associated with these 
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ministries. At the regional level, each of the German states (Länder) has 
agencies that deal with the same issues as the federal ministries, in effect 
mirroring the structure for all 16 states. At the community level, local human 
and veterinary health authorities, hospitals, medical practitioners, and na-
tional reference laboratories deal with human health-related issues.  
In our case study, although the managers were aware of each other’s in-
stitutions (e.g. due to their professional affiliations and education), and alt-
hough informal ties probably did exist, the genesis of an interorganizational 
constellation took place in the total absence of an overarching framework. 
For the purposes of our study, we benefited from sheer serendipity, as we 
were able to track some real-time data. Furthermore, we were able to follow 
new theory-building leads (Miles and Huberman 1994); at the same time, we 
established access to key persons in the respective fields to ensure timely 
and accurate data collection and analysis.  
EHEC is a bacterium present in the intestines of warm-blooded ani-
mals. Although most strains are benevolent, some can cause severe food 
poisoning to humans, which is accompanied, in rare cases, by hemolytic-
uremic syndrome (HUS), a syndrome that is characterized by anemia and 
kidney failure. EHEC infections are frequently (about 800 cases per year) 
reported in Germany. In sharp contrast, between May and July 2011, a novel 
strain of EHEC affected a total of 3,842 patients in the north of Germany 
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(2,987 infected with EHEC and 855 with HUS), causing 53 fatalities, mostly 
around the city of Hamburg. In “normal” years, this same period of time 
would see the occurrence of only 231 cases in the whole country (218 EHEC 
cases and 13 HUS). Although a potential first case could date back to May 
1, 2011, on May 8, 2011, the first patient was officially diagnosed with HUS 
and with what is now known as the EHEC strain O104. From May 8 on, the 
number of patients with both EHEC and HUS increased dramatically, reach-
ing its climax on May 21 and 22. From then on, the number of patients de-
creased quickly at first, then more slowly. Retrospectively, the outbreak was 
declared over on July 5. In the meantime, substantial damage had occurred, 
highlighting the societal and economic relevance of the chosen setting.  
3.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis 
By mainly using the technique of semi-structured interviewing and the analy-
sis of archival and press information, we collected two kinds of data: retro-
spective data concerning the way in which actors had prepared for unex-
pected outbreaks and unknown diseases in the past as well as during the 
current outbreak, and real-time data relating to the way the actors were cop-
ing with this uncertainty in the present. The two kinds of data made it possi-
ble for us to track the changes over time.  
We collected retrospective data relating to EHEC and HUS incidents in 
Germany from 2000. By doing so we avoided a distortion of our results due 
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to heightened media attention and publicity-oriented activities by the affected 
actors during the latest outbreak. Such an ex-post reconstruction by means 
of primarily archival data is considered adequate for understanding how ac-
tors collaborated over time (Harding, Fox, and Mehta 2002). This widely 
used strategy also helps to contrast it with the way respondents reconstruct 
the past when they have to confront past situations in the course of real-time 
data collection (cf. Stallings 2002 for an overview). We use these data 
sources (see Table I for an overview) for triangulation purposes, thus 
heightening the validity of our findings (Yin 2009).  
[Table 1 about here] 
First, to collect retrospective data to track the way key actors handled the 
outbreak, we used independent press and broadcast coverage. Second, to 
understand how the organizations dealt with the outbreak by collaborating 
with each other, we analyzed organizational data on the key actors.  
For triangulation purposes, we used the following sources of real-time 
data: first, we tracked the independent press and other broadcasting cover-
age of the outbreak continually (the same sources used in the retrospective 
data collection). Second, we conducted 43 interviews with key respondents 
from different organizations affected by and/or involved in the disease out-
break. Thus, we have avoided biases in the interpretations of the outbreak 
(cf. Table 2). We oriented the semi-structured interviews towards an inter-
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view guideline that consisted of open-ended questions and follow-up as well 
as clarifying questions. Our goal was to solicit exploratory information about 
the way IORs were generated and reproduced to face the outbreak. Hence, 
we divided each interview roughly into the following four central themes: we 
asked who the key actors were prior to, during, and after the outbreak; what 
challenges they faced; how the public agencies/managers tackled the out-
break; and finally, how and under what conditions did public agen-
cies/managers engage with unknown and familiar actors. The total length of 
the transcribed interview passages is 25 hours and 55 minutes. This ap-
proach has been used by similar analyses (e.g., Kreps et al. 1994) and 
serves to account for the subjective experiences and assessments of the 
persons involved and how they are tied to the respective organizations. To 
heighten the accuracy and consistency of our interpretation of the interviews, 
we used tandem interviewing in 27 of the 43 interviews.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Third, we collected data from seven conferences and workshops in the fields 
of human and veterinary medicine related to the outbreak. We used material 
from participants’ observation of these events, including presentation slides, 
Q&As, and announcements around the respective venues. We strengthened 
the validity of our claims both by attending these conferences and by using 
formal interviews, informal conversations, and other textual and/or visual da-
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ta (e.g., roster listings, conference slides). Thus, we were able to conduct 
impromptu interviews, which we did not transcribe. As suggested by Yin 
(2009), to capture most of the impressions adequately we took extensive 
notes at each event and discussed these results within 24 hours after the 
visit.  
Data analysis did not occur in a linear fashion, but instead took the ap-
proximate form of the following three stages: in the first stage, we stored all 
data collected in a case-study database to heighten reliability (Yin 2009). Pe-
riodic rereading and preparing of protocols (e.g., for the different interorgani-
zational collaborations across time) subsequently formed a basis for com-
prehending the way organizational actors assembled. Stage two consisted of 
writing up a condensed description of how organizations from different con-
texts (e.g., from the political or medical fields) addressed the outbreak. The 
research team discussed the resulting detailed descriptions and used them 
to sensitize each member of the team to the way in which uncertainty is 
practiced on an (inter)organizational level.  
[Table 3 about here] 
In stage three, we condensed the empirical data by combining all the infor-
mation into a joint analysis. In this context, to check the reliability of the cod-
ing framework one team member and one research assistant served as co-
analysts. We consider this step to be very helpful, because co-analysts are 
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able to identify new themes or point out ambiguities. The team could later 
resolve these points by means of re-entering the field, thus heightening the 
data’s validity. The final data structure emerged with coding at the level of a 
text unit, which we defined as a sentence or sequence of sentences convey-
ing a coherent point. Initial coding resulted in first-order categories offered in 
vivo by informants. At first, we placed some text units in multiple categories 
to allow for a rich interpretation of data. In what followed we constructed mu-
tually exclusive, second-order themes and grouped them hierarchically. Do-
ing so led to the collapse of our first-order categories (e.g., no existing and 
existing ties, non-directed ties) into second-order themes (e.g., pre-crisis 
conditions) that represented more abstract and researcher-induced interpre-
tations. At first we grouped these themes according to the different actors, 
but we soon realized that this categorization did not allow us to come up with 
more robust, overarching ways in which organizations assembled to grapple 
with the outbreak. Thereafter, the second-order themes were subsumed un-
der third-order themes that in effect represent the four building blocks (pre-
crisis conditions, barriers, common frame of reference and post-crisis condi-
tions) that constitute the overarching concept of IOA presented in this study. 
Appendixes 1a — 1d provide further samples of statements from the field for 
each category.  
To conclude our analysis and to ensure that we had not misinterpreted 
their views during the analytical process, we presented our findings to one of 
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the leaders of the task force. This final validity check further guaranteed the 
robustness of our analysis.  
4 OBSERVATIONS: IOR FORMATION DURING THE GERMAN E.COLI 
OUTBREAK IN 2011 
4.1 Existing and Missing Collaborative IORs Prior to the Outbreak  
As shown in Figure 1, prior to the outbreak, the organizations primarily in-
volved on a national level were the Federal Ministry of Health and the Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection. Both ministries collaborate sporadical-
ly, but in effect remain separate entities with their own hierarchical structures 
that extend from the national to the local level. Moreover, each ministry is 
associated with government research institutions that are largely operating 
only within their own environments, although each draws on its past experi-
ences with a variety of disease outbreaks. The Ministry of Health collabo-
rates with the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) as its key research institution; the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection draws primarily on 
the competences of the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR) and the 
Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety (BVL). There is oc-
casional cooperation when a disease outbreak affects the areas of responsi-
bility of both ministries and their research institutions, in particular between 
veterinary controls and human health medicine when there are cases of an-
imal diseases. For example, this has been the case during occasional out-
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breaks over the last years with incidences of swine or bird flu (RKI 2011). In 
point of fact, the different nature of these earlier outbreaks, particularly from 
a medical perspective, led to formal, and especially to informal, ties that 
could be renewed for related purposes. However, these ties are usually not 
relevant for future outbreaks (often, food-borne ones), because, given the 
varying epidemiological natures of the diseases, their cradles and their vehi-
cle, different competences are needed. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As noted above, at the regional level, each of the 16 German federal states 
has agencies that deal with the same issues as the federal ministries. Alt-
hough collaboration is infrequent across ministries and their research institu-
tions, there is very little collaboration on the regional level. However, there 
are annual gatherings at which the representatives meet their counterparts 
from the fellow states to discuss general concerns in their areas of responsi-
bility. Thus, we were told, ministries from the German states can rarely, if 
ever, draw on experiences of collaboration across state ministries. At the lo-
cal level, local health authorities, hospitals, medical practitioners, and na-
tional reference laboratories deal with human-health-related issues inde-
pendently. Local veterinary offices and food inspectors deal with animal 
health issues related to the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Pro-
tection. Although these actors are, not least of all because of their profes-
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sional education, aware of the relevant institutions at the regional and na-
tional levels, their activities are usually only related to either local diseases 
and outbreaks or local food inspection and traceability. 
4.2 During the Outbreak I – Barriers to Interorganizational Collaboration 
and Coordination 
Our observations suggest that there are three major barriers to interorgani-
zational coordination: first, there is a lack of established, collaborative, or 
networked IORs that could help to bridge local, state, and federal levels of 
government, and also include links to other organizations that are indispen-
sable for dealing with an epidemic; there is little or no preparedness for cas-
es necessitating cross-agency collaborations. Second, the bureaucratic her-
itage of the agencies in charge of coping with the outbreak and their tenden-
cy to rely on the well-established operating procedures that have been de-
veloped to deal with known and expected issues makes it difficult to develop 
ad hoc coordination and the appropriate IORs. Third, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the unknown source of the epidemic and the difficulty in isolating its 
cradle (i.e. the lack of understanding of the nature of the problem) further 
contributes to these difficulties. 
The absence of established IORs. This lacuna represents a key chal-
lenge to developing ad hoc collaborations, since there were no lines of re-
sponsibilities on how to cooperate across organizations when confronting 
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situations such as the EHEC outbreak. This challenge was twofold. First, 
although organizational actors were aware of each other due to their profes-
sional experience or expertise (for instance, public managers affiliated with 
the RKI knew very well not only of the existence, but also of the responsibili-
ties, of the BfR), these managers, despite being potential “boundary span-
ners” (Adams 1980), were not expecting to collaborate with institutions from 
fields in which they had not collaborated previously. Second, the different 
public agencies were accustomed to operating primarily in their area of ex-
pertise and their (quasi) hierarchies of authority; that is, either dealing with 
human-medicine issues by working in the Federal Ministry of Health arena or 
coping with animal health problems that came under the aegis of the Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection. This NOUN often 
led to unnecessary competition across public agencies. Interviewees fre-
quently pointed out that the very unpreparedness necessarily inherent in un-
known disease outbreaks does not render previous collaborations irrelevant 
per se, but necessitates new ones. Hence, the nature of collaborations did 
not fit the outbreak, and in particular, there was no cognitive or normative 
framework to draw on to handle the outbreak collaboratively across public 
agencies from different levels of analysis. In addition, we received com-
plaints that the existing IORs were neither flexible nor adaptable enough to 
address the multiple problems that crossed functional areas and organiza-
tional boundaries. For example, during one of our visits to the RKI, a pro-
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gram specialist told us that before the EHEC outbreak, he and his team 
would never have expected to work with nephrologists, even though he was 
aware of their activities and professional associations and the fact that 
EHEC/HUS provokes renal failures. In a similar fashion, another respondent 
declared: “I never expected to work with the RKI”. In fact, one of our inform-
ants told us: 
“Nobody really took the initiative [i.e., to engage in collaboration]. No-
body knew whom he or she was missing. I mean, really the health 
professional doesn’t know whom he needs from the side of food safe-
ty. He will say: yes someone around there probably knows about this. 
But who is that person? And how do you get in touch; you can’t know 
all that”. 
Moreover, this lack of interorganizational preparedness was aggravated 
by a lack of support by technological systems or regulatory frameworks. For 
example, the hospitals, overcrowded with EHEC- or HUS-infected patients 
and needing to share capacity, had to develop and use especially innovative 
collaborative work with other hospitals across the country. This ad hoc ar-
rangement did not benefit from any shared structures; existing ones were 
even perceived as detrimental. This situation provoked the launch of a pro-
fessional mailing list that came into being through one serendipitous email 
that a clinical researcher had addressed to all members. Upon receipt of the 
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email, the list was filled with similar queries. After the epidemic, in a podium 
discussion geared towards re-examining the crisis after to the outbreak, the 
director of Germany’s leading university hospital, the Berlin-based Charité, 
declared:  
“We delegated part of our nursing staff, with a quality you would strive 
for like gold dust; they went to Schleswig-Holstein. It all worked out fi-
ne, without a minister or a politician from the opposition to tell us what 
to do, because it was here and there. This means that we are able to 
do so [...]. We are individually responsible for such solutions”.  
Bureaucratic traditions. The deeply rooted background and traditions 
of the administrations in charge did not allow for ad hoc collaboration and 
coordination. Thus, such practices represented a key challenge for initiating 
ad hoc coordination across bureaucratic organizations in general and public 
agencies in particular. Public agencies are used to tackling tasks separately, 
not least concerning the regulated communication processes they have to 
follow. This habit not only pertains to the public agencies as such, but also to 
the federal ministries and their separate hierarchical structures, all the way 
down to the local levels. Two aspects played a significant role in this area: 
first, the reliance on bureaucratic processes inherited from the past, which 
were not created to specifically address unexpected crises such as the out-
break of an unknown disease; and second, the multiplicity of actors as en-
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actment of the decentralized system of federal governance took place. For 
instance, vis-à-vis bureaucratic processes inherited from the past, a key 
medical practitioner complained to us about how the state health agencies 
stuck to their rules concerning communicating about EHEC- or HUS-infected 
patients in their vicinity (for more on communication channels see also Ber-
thod et al. 2012). The public managers at the federal and regional levels, 
unaware that an outbreak was unfolding, relied on the procedures that 
coped with “normal” conditions. This situation led to critical delays across 
local, state, and federal agencies, and resulted in the comparatively late and 
often criticized slow response of the federal ministries and their research in-
stitutions. These federal agencies, the RKI and the BfR, are especially fo-
cused on cutting edge research (RKI 2011). However, as is common in a bu-
reaucratically regulated system, these agencies cannot jump into an out-
break on their own: they must be assigned to do so by their respective minis-
tries. Their ongoing task is to be prepared for yet another unexpected dis-
ease outbreak. As a consequence, their capacity for speedy reaction is per-
ceived as significantly reduced.  
The multiplicity of actors due to the decentralized federal system further 
hindered this preparedness in the first place due to the lack of formal and 
informal interorganizational coordination on the local, state and federal levels 
of action. The two ministries primarily in charge of such outbreaks each co-
ordinate public actions via their two federal agencies, the RKI and the BfR 
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respectively. At the state level, the decentralized nature of the governmental 
system in Germany, a federal republic of 16 states, played a significant role 
in hindering preparedness. This situation meant there were much duplication 
of responsibilities and duties, with numerous agencies in charge of the same 
affairs at both the state and federal levels. This aspect was critical, and cre-
ated difficulties since it meant that the federal agencies received the neces-
sary information comparatively late. In compliance with formal regulations, 
medical doctors to the local and state health authorities first faxed the notifi-
cation requirement for people infected by EHEC. It could take up to two 
weeks before this data was transmitted to the federal level. For example, the 
agency for health and consumer protection in Hamburg first invited the RKI 
to assist them on May 19, 18 days after the official start of the epidemic. And 
two unfortunate circumstances contributed to the worsening of this situation: 
first, two national holidays that took place during the EHEC outbreak further 
slowed the process, and second, both the medical practitioners and the local 
health agencies often sent their information by post, not electronically, caus-
ing a further delay of at least one day.  
The process as such further provoked a blurring in terms of responsibili-
ties across the numerous agencies involved, thus creating a situation partic-
ularly difficult for organizations that were used to sticking closely to intraor-
ganizational administrative rules rather than relying on the interorganization-
al exchange of expertise as the usual mode of action.  
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The procedure (RKI 2011) starts with the clear responsibility of the local 
medical practitioner, who must report any EHEC or HUS case to the local 
health agency (in general one per district) within 24 hours. The local health 
agency then compiles and treats the data according to specific sets of dis-
ease definitions developed by the RKI. The local agencies eventually under-
take their own investigations. They must report this data and their activities 
to the RKI within the next three working days of the following week at the 
latest. The state health and food authorities, who are informed via the munic-
ipal administrations, are then supposed to coordinate these activities and to 
provide a link between the work of the local agencies in the field and the 
state government. At the same time the RKI examines the cases and starts 
its investigations. During the EHEC outbreak, this situation not only brought 
about the ad hoc genesis of collaborations between RKI, state, and local 
food and health agencies (RKI 2011, 15), but also between the RKI, the na-
tion-wide dispersed research laboratories, each of which focused on a single 
disease, and the two federal ministries, the BfR, or the BVL. One expert told 
us:  
“It appeared that there was no central player in this issue. This means 
we had a lot of players whose competences probably played a part 
[…] it is probably true that the RKI and its director were the most visi-
ble in terms of public opinion […] but for me, it was a very diffuse pic-
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ture and it was a big problem that public opinion could not recognize 
any clear responsibility.” 
 Having neither ties among organizations and public managers nor an 
overall legal cognitive and normative framework meant that genesis of col-
laborations across agencies was of necessity spontaneous and organic. This 
fact was especially true in the process of forming collaborative IORs. For in-
stance, one medical practitioner mentioned that he contacted the Federal 
Ministry of Health by phone, a ministry with which he had had no previous 
contact, to directly contact a person in charge of approving research grants. 
He needed to get immediate approval for testing a drug that had previously 
been approved for another disease and that could have been relevant to 
cure the new disease. However, the practitioner noted that this process 
proved difficult:  
“I called the Federal Ministry of Health myself, where the doorman 
greeted me, saying ‘Well, I don’t know either, well, there was some-
one else calling beforehand’ and that was an interesting odyssey 
that took a couple of hours until I had a competent person on the 
phone. In effect it was a combination of … well let’s put it this way, if 
you’ve worked for a university hospital, you have a basic education 
in guerrilla warfare, and you were able to truly capitalize on that.” 
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Extreme uncertainties regarding the epidemic. Because this was an 
as yet unknown form of EHEC, the hospitals and the RKI had to confront se-
vere degrees of uncertainty. This situation implied three interrelated chal-
lenges. First, these organizations had to identify the source of the epidemic, 
i.e., what food was transmitting the germs. Second, hospitals and the RKI 
had to determine what implications this source could have in terms of poten-
tial propagation, and also the as yet unknown strain of the EHEC and what 
implications it could have in terms of potential for recovery and mortality. 
Third, the institutions had to develop adequate methods of treatment, i.e., 
what were the potential outcomes, the chance of success, risk of ineffective-
ness, etc. This was in effect a science- and technology-related barrier that 
had to be solved by the public institutions dedicated to research on epidem-
ics on the one hand, and on food safety on the other. However, the puzzle 
also had to be addressed by the hospitals and medical departments in uni-
versities, all of which represented organizations that function predominantly 
in isolation but whose activities related to the outbreak. It was obvious that to 
overcome the emergency, there needed to be clarification on who needed to 
collaborate with whom, in what form, and to what extent. However, this need 
for clarification created a paradoxical situation, as the needs for collaboration 
could only be established in the process of identifying the source of the out-
break, which was difficult, given the uncertainty surrounding its causes. As 
one of our interviewees admitted: 
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“We had never experienced such a crisis with such dimensions. And 
when in the past something happened from the chemical side, well 
then the trouble came from one product. And there, one had normal 
traceability measures which one knew. It had never been something 
like people dying because of it (...) and this is something one needs 
to understand, that we were not prepared for that.”  
Indeed, the outbreak was unusual in many ways. The strain was new 
and so was its epidemiology. This outbreak was the largest ever-reported in 
Germany. With respect to HUS, this was by far the largest reported world-
wide (Karch 2011). Compared to typical HUS cases, the patients concerned 
with this outbreak were outliers.1 There was great uncertainty about the way 
the disease could unfold, where it was coming from, how it was being spread 
and when it started, since patients with EHEC-related symptoms (but related 
to different strains) are regularly being taken care of. As one medical practi-
tioner recalled: 
“Let’s say after just a week, a certain kind of habituation effect oc-
curred. And from that a certain result was uncertainty. That’s typical 
of a crisis […] uncertainty related to the [organizational] actors, or 
                                            
1 Normally, HUS is considered a pediatric problem. Yet only 2% of the patients of 
2011 were under five years old. Also, the number of women concerned was unusual-
ly high, so that some specialists went so far as to consider bouquets of flowers as 
potential vehicles for the disease. 
31 
 
the consumers, probably even the public-sector employees, as I as-
sume that no one wanted to make a mistake.” 
4.3 During the Outbreak II – Overcoming Barriers 
Obviously, the political, societal, and economic importance of the problem, 
the technical and expertise challenge for the scientific community, plus the 
usual time pressure typical of such crises, all contributed to overcoming the 
barriers. For example, in the first days of the outbreak, the hospitals and 
medical practitioners, as well as local health authorities around Hamburg 
and their staff, were among the first to assemble IORs around EHEC. They 
confronted a sudden and increasing number of patients with HUS symp-
toms, no clear trigger, and no treatment. As noted above, the federal health 
agencies and their affiliated laboratories then stepped in to take control of 
the emergency, and tried to assert their own legitimacy (and capability) and 
dragooning experts and non-public actors into the investigative process. But 
the relevance and appeal of the problem alone was not sufficient to coordi-
nate activities or to deal with the unexpected in a reasonably effective way. 
What actually initialized IOAs was the flexibility enabled by the great uncer-
tainty surrounding the outbreak combined with the relevance and appeal of 
the problem. Organizations and their managers made use of that leeway by 
depending on three factors that were linked. However, here we present the-
se links separately for analytical purposes, the potential organizational ac-
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tors’ gains, past experiences in related contexts, and IT-based infrastruc-
tures.  
Actors’ Gain. The various organizational actors used the temporary 
leeway that resulted from the outbreak, primarily those whose work is usual-
ly governed by bureaucratic rules and procedures. For example, the doctors 
who, in face of the crisis, experienced greater degrees of freedom for treat-
ing the patients than they had under ordinary circumstances, were able to 
ease or even skip the usual administrative work, because of the critical need 
to act fast under intense time pressure to save patients. They greatly appre-
ciated this aspect of the crisis was: 
“It was satisfactory because we really had no firm rules left, well, few 
studies that could help, and, secondly, because all the other things 
like administration in the hospital were overruled. The medical doc-
tors could decide on their own once again, because otherwise you 
always get interference from people who think they understand the 
hospital system.” 
This aspect was based on more than just the humanistic and iconic mis-
sion of medical doctors working for relief and rescue; ambition also played a 
significant role. The practitioners in charge of the patients had a keen inter-
est in playing a role in resolving the outbreak. One medical doctor noted: 
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“You don’t get such a chance, to put it this way, to […] gain aware-
ness, twice [and the doctors] were all eager to publish the first results; 
they [the doctors] are still arguing today about who was the first to 
publish.” 
This situation was also a way for technicians and scientists to take re-
venge on the administrations. Here, the urgency in face of the general feel-
ing of uncertainty made formal rules and procedures a superfluous burden 
for medical doctors, one that could be overcome eventually. This phenome-
non was particularly strong in the context of cooperation among hospitals. 
One medical doctor told us that: 
“I could take nurses from other hospitals, even a chief medical doctor 
from another hospital; anything was possible. Normally, everything 
needs at least six months before a change is made in the structure. 
One cannot decide on one’s own. Especially with regard to organizing, 
structuring: you could do anything, as you thought best. Suddenly, 
they had respect for it.”  
However, this attitude should not be interpreted too literally. Although 
fighting the crisis was undeniably the shared goal of the newly created IOA, 
each organizational actor obviously had different goals in mind, thus creating 
a large potential for conflicts on the one hand, but also for mutual control. A 
senior official told us that: 
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“It was not like he [i.e., one of the leading scientists working on EHEC] 
got undisputed support. Because, obviously, there were different 
camps. The BfR has its own interests, the RKI has its own interests and 
unfortunately the interests get partly mixed, the scientific interests, and 
the, hm … civil protection. Scholars have a scientific interest first. But 
the RKI or the BfR should have as their single interest a need to help 
people, and sometimes all this got mixed. But this is difficult. Because 
they need specific ways to kick things off, specific procedures and, hm 
(…) this is difficult.” 
Past Experiences. Drawing on past experiences in related crisis con-
texts, and at the same time adapting transferable practices, occurred when 
state and federal agencies decided to bundle resources by creating a task 
force to further investigate the issue and identify the source of EHEC. In-
spired by previous challenges during the bird and swine flu epidemics, the 
composition of the task force was a way to centralize communication and 
bundle ideas, propositions, and analytical efforts. In the case of EHEC, it en-
compassed experts from the RKI, the BVL, the BfR, from the human and 
veterinary health-related state authorities concerned, and from the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Since there was the question of finding a so-
lution to deal with the outbreak, the discussions quickly revealed the need to 
bundle different sources of expertise, knowledge, and capabilities. These 
discussions attracted people with experience in task forces and crisis man-
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agement groups in different fields, all of whom were then instrumental in op-
erationalizing this emerging strategy. From the formation of the interorgani-
zational task force onwards, activities were divided among its members, 
along an improvised mind map that focused the attention of all the public 
managers involved on one leading question: “What do we want to know 
about an outbreak-cluster?” (BVL 2001). The RKI became the entity in 
charge of identifying the source from the patients’ perspective, e.g., asking, 
“What did you eat last Thursday?” as well as determining alternative and 
perhaps forgotten exposure to products that could carry the disease. The 
rest of the task force would work towards inspecting food production and dis-
tribution processes based on the clues provided by the RKI. The benefit of 
the task force was the maximization of resources and insights and their flex-
ibility in coming together across organizational boundaries without the rela-
tional depth of conventional project-based structures. A senior official told us 
that: 
“Therefore, there was someone, a sort of liaison officer in the task 
force, representing the RKI issues. But there were also all the deliv-
ery pathways, to the understanding of which we could not contribute. 
And in such critical situations those people who know better are also 
needed here [at the RKI]. They can’t sit around with the task force 
the whole day, where our expertise is only needed for only a 10-
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minute discussion. So all these people suddenly had to be every-
where at once.” 
To more deeply examine clues, members of the RKI suggested a new 
method to deal with the uncertainty related to the specific EHEC strain. 
This novel approach was inspired by a criminal investigation technique, 
the use of what is called a recipe-based restaurant cohort study. RKI re-
searchers made pictures of numerous dishes served by one restaurant 
where an intriguingly high number of patients had become ill. The re-
searchers showed the pictures to the patients and compared their an-
swers with a full list of the dishes’ ingredients, provided by the cook. This 
method made the retrospective detection of the source much easier: bean 
sprouts spread over the salads seemed to play a part. The sprouts were 
delivered by an organic farm in Germany, which had imported the seeds 
of fenugreek from Egypt. To find this out, the scientific staff at BfR gave 
the new task force database information on patients’ exposure and food 
deliveries. By doing so, they were able to superpose data and coordinate 
their joint analysis over the different state boundaries and thus identify 
clusters of infections (RKI 2011).  
IT Infrastructure. Another structural component combined to assemble 
new IORs and to cope with the emergency was the IT infrastructure. By us-
ing IT, medical practitioners and hospital managers were able to refine their 
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way of communicating with each other by exchanging information regularly 
via online forums and databases. They could use either the technological 
structures that were already at hand and recombine them in new ways, as 
noted above with respect to the mailing lists and the exchange of capacity, 
or create new ones from scratch. For instance, a medical doctor launched 
the idea of sharing anonymous data on patients and centralizing the data in 
a register for comparative purposes. After a previous outbreak of bird flu, this 
same practitioner had tried to publish his results in top-tier scientific journals. 
However, he was severely criticized by reviewers, who complained that he 
had not made his database systematically comparable with data from other 
countries. He built on this experience and launched a new cooperative tool 
that would link actors across the country and ease medical research on the 
new strain: 
“…from the moment when the first cases [of EHEC] were reported 
and it became obvious that there would be many more, I told myself 
while the publication [the one not yet published and related to bird flu] 
was still sitting on my desk: ‘Well, this time there’ll be a register, yes, 
this won’t happen to me again.” 
In a related occurrence, representatives of the federal and state health 
and food authorities who were included in a task force experienced how 
technology, functioning as a new bundle of tools available to the agencies at 
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hand, could bridge unrelated actors and support the formation of IORs. For 
example, software and a dedicated database were developed during the 
process with the help of experts from the EFSA, and subsequently optimized 
to function collaboratively. This program made it possible for actors to ana-
lyze the flows of food and related data, such as delivery bills, but also res-
taurant menus and recipes, in the critical time period. Different organizations 
in the field had collected this data and needed to centralize it across states. 
The scientific staff of the BVL analyzed the data and thus was able to trace 
the chains. In this process, missing data was easily identified and ordered 
from the local authorities. For example, the state food and consumer protec-
tion authority in charge of the sector of organic farming compiled visual rep-
resentations of the business relations of every farm. This collaboration 
proved essential for the identification of subsequent critical junctures (BVL 
2011, 5). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
4.4 After the Outbreak – Learning and Institutionalizing? 
After the RKI had declared the outbreak over on July 27, interviewees ar-
gued that the handling of this outbreak was different from previous ones. 
Apart from strengthening existing ties and opening up new ones with new 
partners (see Figure 2 for an overview), one of the positive side effects of 
the outbreak was that it eased communication within and across organiza-
tions. This eased communication holds particularly true for the informal con-
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tacts between managers from different institutions. Here, one interviewee 
who had worked in the U.S. for a long time told us that:  
“The communication has become more like in the U.S.; now [after the 
outbreak] you pick up the phone more easily [to talk to colleagues] 
and this also triggers other unconventional forms of handling such 
outbreaks.”  
In our observations, other instances that resulted in similar good effects 
included the institutionalization of the task force as a permanent interorgani-
zational tool, thus making it possible for agencies to be better prepared for 
future EHEC outbreaks. Medical experts have argued that if there are future 
outbreaks, it is likely that actors will again use IT tools such as joint data-
bases to compare cases across their various organizations, and will make 
arrangements for joint telephone conferences and work sessions to coordi-
nate their activities. Until the EHEC outbreak, this practice was (and still is) 
uncommon, not only for this particular outbreak, but for disease outbreaks in 
general. In sharp contrast, the task force as an interorganizational form is on 
its way to being officially recognized as the correct tool for gathering together 
human health professionals, food safety professionals, and expert laborato-
ries on an ad hoc basis.  
In the autumn of 2012, the experience gained during the EHEC case 
was put to good use in a case of infected strawberries that had been distrib-
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uted in the cafeterias of German schools. Although this case did not cause 
any fatalities and was easier to define than was the EHEC (only one compa-
ny was responsible for the food deliveries at the schools), the organizations 
quickly drew on the task force as an interorganizational form to determine 
the skills and knowledge needed for the job, the actors who would be re-
sponsible, and a joint action plan and hypotheses to work on. Thus, the task 
force is considered a valuable device for organizing work on an ad hoc ba-
sis, and obviating the need to create new, overarching bureaucracies or es-
tablishing a centralized form of governance in the hands of one administra-
tion. Although one organization is in charge of making the first phone calls, 
this responsibility does not take the form of a governance role. As one of our 
informants told us, when considering the recent case of infected strawber-
ries: 
“It worked out fine [i.e. the task force]. It was appropriately quick. 
There were mistakes too, sure; it’s always a part of it and nothing 
has ever worked without mistakes. There are always some kinds of 
problems in there. But it was way better than during the EHEC out-
break. It was quicker, the mechanism has worked out; really: les-




5 DISCUSSION: TOWARDS A MODEL OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
ASSEMBLAGE  
In future emergencies such as the outbreak of EHEC in Germany 2011, nu-
merous organizational actors will most likely again collaborate for a joint 
purpose. Despite a substantial lack of prior ties, such collaboration does not 
come out of nowhere. Instead, it is made possible with the help of existing 
experiences, procedures, and structures, which themselves contribute, in a 
dramatic duality, to sustaining other barriers to cooperation. What plays a 
critical role is the managers’ ability to perform new interorganizational as-
semblages (Ong 2004; Ong and Collier 2005). With “assemblage” we mean 
two or more previously unconnected organizations collaborating on an ad 
hoc basis while temporarily being called upon to tackle a crisis. Assemblage 
emerge when managers who, because of their professional expertise or 
simply by their general education, might have been aware of other public 
agencies and other organizations but who were not in contact with each oth-
er organizationally. Moreover, IOA revert to differing established intra- and 
particularly interorganizational structures (in prior research, for instance ICS; 
cf. Bigley and Roberts 2001; Moynihan 2009) that are enacted and put into 
practice in a modified form in order to tackle the unforeseen challenges 
ahead. As one respondent noted, these are the “checklists [and] platforms of 
expertise” already in place, but they need to be turned into a tailor-made so-
lution with regard to the respective crisis” (here, the disease outbreak).  
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 [Figure 3 about here] 
Generalizing from our observations, we suggest a preliminary model of 
IOAs as shown in Figure 3. This model roughly differentiates between the 
phases prior to, during, and after the crisis. In this model IOAs and IORs are 
distinguished from each other, as IOAs are, by definition, a process and 
IORs are a state. IORs are not only a likely outcome of IOA but have to be 
reproduced with the help of interorganizational practices in order to be main-
tained. The fact that IOAs comprise the inclusion of ties that are newly gen-
erated in an ad hoc fashion in the course of the crisis is highlighted in Figure 
3 by the black shaded forms that relate solely to IOAs. The white forms re-
late to existing IORs. The grey shaded space depicts the actual core of the 
IOA process. It relates to both IOAs and IORs, and highlights the need to 
adapt the new ties to the already established IORs, with the possible or even 
likely outcome of gaining not only more ties that are better adapted to man-
aging the crisis at hand, but also to more multiplex ties (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994).  
Our explorative study has shown that in the pre-crisis phase, there were 
numerous existing ties across organizations, including public agencies. 
However, these ties, either took the form of maintained IORs (e.g., when ac-
tors collaborated in the form of a network dyad or even a whole network, 
such as the national reference laboratories) or latent ties (e.g., in which ac-
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tors had previously collaborated with each other, but were not currently do-
ing so; see, e.g., Bigley and Roberts 2001; Robinson et al. 2006). In addi-
tion, and this is key to our concept of IOAs in the pre-crisis phase, there 
were also many organizational actors who were previously unconnected to 
each other. In some cases (among hospitals, state agencies and federal 
ministries), the ties existed but were not related to foodborne disease out-
breaks. Organizations that for this particular purpose were unconnected 
were pulled into the center of the nascent IOA when they became aware of 
each other by looking for complementarity in activities and capabilities. In 
some cases, organizations were even mandated to collaborate with each 
other once the crisis started. In contrast to Provan and Kenis’ predictions 
(2008) on network governance, in this case the absence of centralized net-
work governance and of consensus on a goal prior to the crisis did not pre-
vent the organizations from successfully building ad hoc ties that would 
eventually address the crisis. Robinson et al. (2006) note that the need to 
collaborate did not start from mutual ignorance. Instead, prior to the crisis, 
the nonexistence of IORs was based on the lack of operative needs. For ex-
ample, the consumer protection authorities had never needed to collaborate 
with health and emergency services. These arguments lead us to the follow-
ing proposition:  
Proposition 1: A crisis makes the lack of relevant ties apparent, 
especially among heterogeneous organizational actors. 
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This approach represents a key difference with previous studies of inter-
organizational answers to emergencies, such as Bigley and Roberts’ (2001) 
and Moynihan’s (2009) studies of ICS. Because forms of ICS were applied in 
situations that involved great uncertainty, the organizations previously af-
fected by an unforeseen event were able to coordinate their activities along 
at least partially pre-established lines. This preparedness results from a 
shared awareness among actors and appropriate measures that have been 
derived from the ICS framework (Bigley and Roberts 2001; Moynihan 2009). 
In contrast, the concept of IOA incorporates organizations that were previ-
ously unconnected. Thus, we contribute to the literature on network for-
mation in general and on ad hoc initial tie formation in particular (e.g., 
Bardach 2001) by proposing that tie and network formation may rely to a 
significant extent on ad hoc governance that is sensitive to operative needs. 
In particular, our study shows, and our model reflects, that in the absence of 
actual relationships, tie formation or even the creation of whole networks 
may emerge from a basic awareness of organizational actors and their po-
tential complementarity in operative terms.  
However, specific forms of intra- and interorganizational barriers might 
hinder this process. During a crisis, actors need to overcome these barriers, 
which they may do by relying on or even constructing a common frame of 
reference, a process that is enabled and fostered by the need to react quick-
ly to alleviate the detrimental effects of the crisis. This puts considerable time 
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pressure on the organizational actors (Boin, 't Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 
2005; Grzymala-Busse 2011). The undisputed need to act and the time 
compression are closely connected to increasing room to maneuver; that is, 
organizational actors seize the opportunity to make use of the range of op-
tions at hand. Because of the crisis, their scope is widened temporarily to an 
uncommonly substantial extent. Actors use this leeway as they try to gain 
benefits, draw on past experiences, and learn (for more on learning from ex-
treme events see Müller-Seitz and Macpherson in press). 
Hence, we contribute to the study of interorganizational networks in gen-
eral and of the ad hoc genesis of collaborative IORs in particular, not least in 
the field of public management. In addition to other studies of emerging in-
terorganizational networks, such as that by Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) and 
Kenis and Knoke (2002), our research shows that the genesis of collabora-
tive ties does not necessarily rely on established ties, but may well occur ad 
hoc, based on other kinds of structures (see also Phillips, Lawrence, and 
Hardy 2000; Levina and Orlikowski 2009). The previously existing field, 
comprised of latent and activated ties, was highly structured. This structu-
ration contributed to making inexistent ties more difficult to build on an ad 
hoc basis, and made it imperative for agents, and indeed whole organiza-
tions, to work creatively on new interorganizational solutions. In the field of 
public management this knowledge is already well established. In particular, 
Comfort (1994a, 2002b; see also Kapucu 2006a, b) shows how organiza-
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tions, both private and public, collaborated, some of them interacting with 
one another for the first time, in their attempt to deal with the Pittsburgh oil 
spill of 1988. Comfort’s approach builds on biological allegories of social sys-
tems, and hence, on ideas of natural selection and evolution (Kauffman 
1993). However, such a perspective abstracts somewhat from the percep-
tions, cognitions, and the professional background that organizational actors 
have and the sensemaking processes in which they engage (see also Com-
fort 2007). In point of fact, in Comfort (2002b) the major driver for inter-
organizational action depends here “…on the extent and effectiveness of in-
formation and communication processes operating within the interorganiza-
tional system, and the ensuing capacity to foster collective learning and ad-
aptation” (Comfort 2002b: 101). This approach is somewhat similar to 
Bardach’s views (1998, 2001) on the emergence of interagency collabora-
tion as a process of “platforming”, which he defines as practices that result in 
building up an interorganizational collaborative capacity. Although we agree 
with the relevance of exogenous events as sources of membership, and with 
information and communication as means for sensemaking in extreme 
events, we suggest that this approach tends to ignore embeddedness into 
different geographical or professional contexts (see in a similar vein Robin-
son et al. 2006). Such contexts include vested interests and the power to 
act, thus producing an image of interorganizational constellations from a 
bird’s-eye view that, in addition, appears at least partially functional. This 
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shortcoming emerges mostly because, to observe its overall genesis, adap-
tive system dynamics research looks at connections across actors at the 
system level of analysis functioning and evolution, thus diminishing its theo-
retical sensitivity to actual organizational action and the social context in 
which public managers engage in tie or network formation.  
Research on networks that is more interpretive is sensitive towards the 
role of structures of signification and legitimation and of resources of domi-
nation (Giddens 1984). Driven by in-depth qualitative analyses (Morçöl and 
Wachhaus 2009), it has already pointed at contextual issues such as collec-
tive rationalities and conflicting interests (e.g. Davies 2011), or idiosyncratic 
culture and values (e.g. Hay and Richards 2000; Moynihan and Pandey 
2008; Weiss 1987). For example, Provan and Milward (1991) test how pres-
sures in terms of norms, values and expectations issued by the specific insti-
tutional environment may act as drivers for tie formation and network in-
volvement among public administrations. In a similar vein, O’Toole and Mei-
er (2004) note that most studies tend to depoliticize the network as a phe-
nomenon, thus avoiding “…the likelihood that, rather than being neutral pro-
ducers of collective goods … network managers respond to the stronger and 
more politically powerful elements of their surroundings” (2004, 681). Being 
sensitive to actors and contexts, as well as to structures, which they enact 
and reproduce (Giddens, 1984), to understand tie formation, or even the 
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genesis of complex networks, represents an important component of our 
IOA conception.  
Hence, we submit that ties will vary in their multiplexity (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994) prior to a crisis. On the one hand, these ties can be uniplex 
(e.g., a professional relationship based on joint data analysis); on the other 
hand, in the sense of Kenis and Knoke (2002), they might create a collabo-
rative relationship that is multiplex in terms of modalities, e.g., an actual ex-
change of staff between two agencies to explore possibilities for joint pro-
jects and an actual collaboration in the joint analysis of specific data. The 
nature of this multiplexity is likely to vary, depending on the professional 
and/or jurisdictional background.  
As an example we cited the medical practitioners in hospitals, who, dur-
ing the outbreak, were more likely to engage with fellow colleagues and use 
the existing IT infrastructures. When ad hoc formation is called for, actors 
tend to seize all the possibilities at hand in an explorative way in order to 
identify the modalities that are best scalable (also for intentionally inducing 
uncertainty, see Müller-Seitz, 2014). This diversity of possibilities is easier to 
identify in the individual actors’ professional fields, fostering shared cogni-
tions and norms that actors can draw on strategically to initiate working to-
gether (Kellogg 2011). For example, it was clear to medical practitioners that 
the RKI needed to be part of the game. But in contrast, the need to involve 
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consumer protection authorities was not that clear. Generalizing from the lit-
erature and our own empirical observations suggests the following proposi-
tion:  
Proposition 2: Organizational actors who share a common frame 
of reference are more likely to overcome barriers to forming ad hoc 
ties. 
The post-crisis conditions differ from the pre-crisis conditions in one criti-
cal point that is essential for IOAs: ties for coping with crises have not only 
been reproduced, but either IOA-relevant ties have also been initially formed 
between previously unconnected actors or else non-directed ties have been 
adapted to a new purpose (Robinson et al. 2006; in a similar vein, Bardach 
1998). Thus, we suggest that such unforeseen events have a positive side 
effect, in that IOAs offer fruitful ground for future exchanges. For our study, 
respondents repeatedly told us that they were now able to revert to a broad-
er interpersonal and interorganizational network because the EHEC out-
break put them in touch with previously unknown persons. In this connec-
tion, both our interviewees and previous research on IORs lead us to pro-
pose as follows for the post-crisis situation: 
Proposition 3a: During a crisis, organizational actors can draw on 
both newly established ties and reproduced ties that feed into exist-
ing latent or manifest ties for the next pre-crisis situation. 
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Alternatively, tie termination might occur. This closure might either be the 
result of intentional tie lopping (e.g., as public agencies reorganize their ac-
tivities) or happen unintentionally as ties dissolve (e.g., as a manager re-
tires). Interviewees confirmed both types of tie terminations a year after the 
outbreak occurred. Hence, we propose the following:  
Proposition 3b: Tie termination results in a lack of interorganiza-
tional relations in the subsequent pre-crisis situation, which has to 
be compensated for by IOAs in the face of the next crisis. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
In this study we answer the question of how organizational actors form IORs 
on an ad hoc basis, and how they coordinate their activities to cope with cri-
ses, eventually even constructing whole networks that are more complex. 
The case of the EHEC outbreak in Germany in 2011 provides us with an 
empirical setting to analyze how this took place despite important barriers to 
interorganizational collaboration. Thus, we inform previous research in two 
ways. First, by introducing our model of interorganizational assemblage, we 
direct attention to how actors face crises by means of initiating ties and rely-
ing on existing dyads or networks of IORs. Second, we inform organization 
and network theory on how relations form among organizational agents that 
did not have prior ties that were relevant to dealing with the problem at hand.  
51 
 
Although we believe that our findings are at least partially generalizable 
to other cases, our study’s contribution is limited by our method. At least 
three distinct limitations merit attention. First, because it was occasionally 
difficult to differentiate individual from organizational efforts in the data, quite 
often, what was initially an individual initiative was presented as an organiza-
tional strategy. Organizations did so as a way to rationalize ex post the con-
duct of the whole organization. In some instances, we were able to find this 
out during interviews, but not always. To bypass this limitation, we believe it 
is necessary to collect more ethnographic data. This data would make it 
possible for researchers to grasp in situ, and during the action, who did what 
and under what circumstances.  
This suggestion leads us to a second limitation: participant observation 
is difficult to achieve in this highly contested field, but might be worth pursu-
ing (Harding et al. 2002; Homan 2003). Such an approach might result in 
finer-grained data from actors in the face of such an outbreak (see Moynihan 
2009; Stallings 2002). Although our method of data collection is common in 
research on unexpected events, this lack of data is often deemed an inevita-
ble shortcoming (Stallings 2002) that needs to be acknowledged. Finally, a 
social network analysis of the actors involved in the different existing and 
emerging working relationships might have helped us to better comprehend 
how existing relationships impact the formation of new ones, and especially 
the development of practices that are used in the course of inter-
52 
 
organizational assemblages (Kapucu 2006a). We attempted both strategies 
in order to allow for triangulation in our method, but due to severe legal re-
strictions imposed by the public prosecution authorities and to the difficulties 
for informants to truly assess, ex post, the depth of a former relation once 
stronger ties had been established, we were not able to obtain either obser-
vational or network data. 
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 Table 1: Field documents 
Type of document Documents analyzed
Professional journals, trade 
magazines
Ärzte Zeitung online (aerztezeitung.de), Bundesgesundheitsblatt, Lancet, Medizinreport
International organizations Eurobarometer, Eurosurveillance.org, WHO (euro.who.int)
Non-governmental organizations foodwatch, Greenpeace, National Consumer Council                                      
Online media bbc.co.uk, bloomberg.com, idw-online.de, ndr.de
Press releases by public authorities Federal public authorities (hamburg.de/bgv; lgl.bayern.de; umwelt.nrw.de; mlr-baden-
wuerttemberg.de), Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (bfr.bund.de), Federal Office of 
Consumer Protection and Food Safety (bvl.bund.de), German government 
(bundesregierung.de), European Parliament, European Council
Robert Koch Institute Epidemiological Bulletins (1997-2011), Infection epidemiological yearbooks (2001-
2009), press releases
Daily press                                                                                                       
(print and online versions)
Spiegel, Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Handelsblatt, Science, 
sueddeutsche.de, tagesschau.de, Wirtschaftswoche 
Others lebensmittelzeitung.net, uke.de  
 
Table 2: Interview data 
Type Function Number of interviews
Research institution Veterinary public health (6), human medicine (5), prevention and 
investigation of food-borne disease outbreaks (2) and organizational 
behavior / strategy (3)
16
Hospital Medical practitioners (10), head of 'nephrology' unit (1) 11





Task force rapid response (3), farming and genetically modified food 
(1), globalization issues (1)
5
Local state agency Coordinator of zoonotic diseases (1), Health care department (2) 3
For-profit organizations Managing director trade association (1), laboratory manager (1) 2
Media Head 'Newsroom' (1), head 'health care' (1) 2










Figure 2: Post-EHEC outbreak collaborative structure. 
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Figure 3: A preliminary model of interorganizational assemblage.  
  
